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Abstract 
 
This paper sheds new light on a long-standing puzzle in the international finance literature, 
namely, that exchange rate expectations appear inaccurate and even irrational. We find for a 
comprehensive dataset that individual forecasters’ performance is skill-based. ‘Superior’ fore-
casters show consistent ability as their forecasting success holds across currencies. They seem 
to possess knowledge on the role of fundamentals in explaining exchange rate behavior, as 
indicated by better interest rate forecasts. Superior forecasters are more experienced than the 
median forecaster and have fewer personnel responsibilities. Accordingly, foreign exchange 
markets may function in less puzzling and irrational ways than is often thought. 
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Exchange rate forecasters’ performance: evidence of skill? 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Is it really convincing that professional exchange rate forecasters persistently form in-
accurate expectations, implying clear inefficiency in foreign exchange markets? This view 
was established twenty years ago by Frankel and Froot (1987). Their result has been con-
firmed in many subsequent studies, covering consensus expectations as well as expectations 
of individual forecasters and has become something of a stylized fact in the international fi-
nance literature.1 However, there is contradicting evidence as well. Elliott and Ito (1999) 
show for an 11 years period that 42 firms’ yen/US dollar forecasts seem to be slightly profit-
able, a view being shared by a few other studies on firm performances, including Goodman 
(1979) and Pojarliev and Levich (2007). Thus, there is doubt whether the Frankel and Froot 
verdict is a truly general characterization of exchange rate forecasters’ performance. 
This inconclusive evidence of existing studies, however, raises new questions. Why do 
some studies indicate irrational and others rational forecasting behavior? Are these opposing 
results largely accidental and thus driven by small samples drawn from a universe of hetero-
geneous forecasters? There is indeed some evidence indicating heterogeneous performance 
among exchange rate forecasters. However, what drives this heterogeneity? Are some fore-
casters just better than others because they are lucky or are there any systematic determinants? 
This is an important issue because the potential answer indicates a dramatically different view 
of the foreign exchange market than the conventional wisdom suggests. If performance is 
only driven by chance and not at all by skill then the outcome of this market would be re-
garded in a skeptical way. If, however, heterogeneous forecasting performance can be traced 
to skill, then the foreign exchange market seems to function like other markets and outcomes 
of this market, i.e. exchange rates, would be regarded as trustworthy prices. 
In order to find out whether exchange rate forecasters’ performance can be related to 
their skill, we regress possible skill-based determinants on a cross-section of forecasters’ per-
formance, an approach which has previously been applied in stock markets. Analyzing the 
success of forecasters, however, puts two strong requirements on the underlying data. First, 
and distinguishing this research from all former related studies on foreign exchange, one 
needs truly individual data that can be linked to further characteristics of these same forecast-
ers. Second, the data set has to be comprehensive in order to provide variation in the cross-
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section (i.e. many forecasters), in the time-series (i.e. including exchange rate up- and down-
swings) and in the object of forecasting (i.e. several exchange rates). We employ such a data 
set with about 150 professional forecasters, forecasting three exchange rates over a maximum 
period of 14 years. 
The guiding question of our research is whether forecasting performance is systemati-
cally determined by skill, comparable to stock markets where performance can be partially 
explained in this way. In particular, we examine three questions: 
First, is superior exchange rate forecasting based on ability in understanding foreign ex-
change markets in general as success determinants are not only specific to one exchange rate? 
We test this by examining whether the performance in forecasting an exchange rate can be 
explained by the performance in forecasting another exchange rate. 
Second, is superior exchange rate forecasting determined by knowledge about exchange 
rate fundamentals? In order to test this we rely on “our” forecasters’ performance in contem-
poraneously forecasting several fundamentals. 
Third, is superior exchange rate forecasting determined by some personal characteris-
tics? We test this by relating performance to a set of available personal characteristics. 
Whatever determinants we find, the relevance of our findings rests on three foundations. 
First, is our data set reliable in the sense that earlier stylized facts can be reproduced? Second, 
is the level of forecasting performance sensible for a competitive market, i.e. not too good and 
not too bad? Third, is heterogeneity in forecasters’ performance so large that it is economi-
cally relevant to examine its determinants? Fortunately, determinants are revealed in a sample 
providing solid foundations: irrational forecasting behavior is shown but for some shorter 
time periods only; the level of forecasting success is slightly better than random forecasting2 
and performance heterogeneity is profound (and beyond accidental heterogeneity). Based on 
these foundations we test the above mentioned three hypotheses which receive support: first, 
forecasters show consistent ability in that their success holds across currencies. Second, fore-
casters seem to possess knowledge on the role of fundamentals in explaining exchange rate 
behavior, as indicated by better interest rate forecasts. Third, better forecasters are more ex-
perienced than the median forecaster and in addition have fewer personnel responsibilities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1  See Dominguez (1986), the surveys by Takagi (1991) and MacDonald (2000), and the recent con-
firmation by Bacchetta et al. (2009). 
2  The average performance we find is slightly better than a random forecast, but not consistently so, as 
we will show later. Thus, there remains some uncertainty about the degree of forecasters’ perform-
ance, which we think is unavoidable in efficient markets. Clearly, irrational or poor forecasts are a 
sign of inefficiency, as of course are significantly good forecasts. 
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The paper is structured in seven parts. Section 2 relates our research to the literature and 
Section 3 introduces our data. In Section 4 we examine heterogeneity in performances among 
our forecasters, while in Section 5 we relate exchange rate forecast performance to individu-
als’ corresponding forecast performance of exchange rate fundamentals. Then Section 6 links 
forecast performance of the individuals to related personal characteristics. In order to test for 
robustness, the main analyses are repeated in Section 7 by using profits based upon a popular 
trading strategy. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Related literature 
Following on from the seminal paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983), it has become a styl-
ized fact that foreign exchange rates are difficult to forecast at horizons of less than three 
years (Frankel and Rose, 1995, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000, Cheung et al., 2005).3 However, 
this view has been challenged in a number of papers (for example, MacDonald and Taylor, 
1994, MacDonald, 1999), where it is demonstrated that the successful modeling of the under-
lying data generation process can produce successful out-of-sample forecasts at horizons as 
short as two months ahead. In particular the monetary model’s fundamentals seem to be 
linked to exchange rates (see e.g. MacDonald, 1999, Rapach and Wohar, 2002, Kilian and 
Taylor, 2003, Sarno et al., 2004, and Abhyankar et al., 2005). However, stability of these 
findings and forecasting power are challenged by Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008). 
In addition, practitioners provide a challenging contrast to the academic pessimism as 
we observe a gigantic volume in currency transactions which easily dominates that of the 
largest stock exchanges. Professionals who are relevant in this market – indicated by the size 
of their salaries and by the volume of assets under management – put money behind their 
forecasts, which questions the conventional academic wisdom of enduring “systematic expec-
tational errors” by professional exchange rate forecasters (Frankel and Froot, 1987, p.150).4 
Therefore, it would seem wrong to preclude that some forecasters may be able to inter-
pret fundamentals in a useful way, showing that some forecasters might be superior to others. 
There is, indeed, mixed evidence on exchange rate forecasting performance. The literature 
starts with two early studies covering a small group of financial services which produce ex-
                                                 
3  Recent research argues that this disconnection may be caused either by a time-consuming aggrega-
tion process (Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2006), or by a non-fundamental price determinant resulting 
from the use of technical analysis (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006). 
4  According to the Bank for International Settlements (2005), the average daily turnover in April 2004 
measured in billions of US-dollar for the US-dollar/euro, the JP-yen/euro and the GB-pound/euro 
market was 501, 51 and 43 respectively. 
 5
change rate forecasts on a professional basis and show ability (Goodman, 1979, and extension 
by Levich, 1979).5 
The first study analyzing a broader sample of individual exchange rate forecasts is Ito 
(1990). He examines the yen-dollar exchange rate expectations collected by the Japan Center 
for International Finance (JCIF) over the period May 1985 to June 1987. The data set has a 
panel dimension, due to 44 firms from six industries participating. Ito finds heterogeneity in 
expectation formation, indicated by significant individual effects in the panel analysis, and 
questions forecasters’ rationality.6 However, false expectations may be due to small sample 
size, as Ito (1990, p.437) states with respect to the yen appreciation after September 1985. 
Another source of forecasting data is provided by Consensus Economics which consists 
of monthly forecasts of about 150 institutions. The individual dimension of this data is exam-
ined by MacDonald and Marsh (1994), who analyze the complete response of 30 forecasters 
over two years. Again, forecasts are mostly inaccurate, irrational and unprofitable. Findings 
are extended and largely confirmed by MacDonald and Marsh (1996) who also interestingly 
note that top performers in one currency are not necessarily also among the best in another 
currency, although this examination is limited to just 22 forecasters due to incomplete re-
sponses.7 
The first sample which was long enough to cover both up- and downswings of exchange 
rates is Elliott and Ito (1999, p.435), who extend the sample from Ito (1990) to an eleven- 
year period until May 1996 and find that “survey data can be used to obtain on average posi-
tive profits”. Interestingly, there is evidence that profits are quite volatile over time and that 
they are related to a common measure of risk, i.e. the difference between the forward rate and 
the average expected rate (Frankel and Froot, 1987). However, profits are not related to an-
other measure of risk, i.e. dispersion of forecasts. 
Finally, Pojarliev and Levich (2007) analyze the performance of 34 currency funds over 
17 years and find profitability, indicating forecasting ability. They emphasize, however, that 
this performance is largely the compensation for several risk factors. 
                                                 
5  Further evidence on small samples contributes to the impression of heterogeneity: Blake et al. 
(1986) do not find ability in the exchange rate forecasting performance of three British institutions 
over five exchange rates at two horizons during three to four years, whereas Allen and Taylor (1990) 
do find some ability in their tracking of technical analysts’ exchange rate forecasts. 
6  This is supported by Wakita’s (1989) analysis of a slightly extended sample ranging from May 1985 
to March 1988. 
7  Marsh and Power (1996) examine these 22 forecasters and assess their implicit portfolios built on 
long or short positions in three exchange rates. Although some forecasters seem to give profitable 
advice, only one forecaster does consistently so by significantly beating the no change alternative. 
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We summarize four main findings of studies on individual (or firm-specific) exchange 
rate expectations: first, there is indeed heterogeneity which makes it important to focus on 
individual forecasts and their determinants. Second, in order to avoid distorted performance 
the use of longer samples seems important. Third, evidence indicates that inaccurate point 
forecasts may be nevertheless good directional and profitable forecasts. Fourth, profits may 
represent a compensation for risk. 
As the value of forecasts is thus questionable and forecasters seem to be so different in 
performance (for stock fund managers see Kosowski et al., 2006) and approach, it would be 
interesting to have more information about the determinants of their behavior. One important 
question for exchange rates is whether good forecasts are related to knowledge about eco-
nomic fundamentals. Loh and Mian (2006) find such a relation for stock market analysts but 
for the foreign exchange market we are unaware of any comparable study. 
The literature has also identified some personal characteristics that might help to under-
stand (forecasting) performance. Chevalier and Ellisson (1999) find that good education im-
proves the performance of fund managers. Another important variable is professional experi-
ence. More experienced analysts underreact less to prior earnings information (Mikhail et al., 
2004) and issue rather bold and accurate than herding forecasts (Clement and Tse, 2005). 
Again, we are unaware of any such study in foreign exchange. 
 
3 Data 
Our analysis is based upon a micro dataset comprising more than 14 years of individual 
forecasts from the Financial Market Survey (Finanzmarkttest) of the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. The individual forecasts constitute the 
data from which monthly aggregate statistics, such as consensus forecasts, have been com-
puted from December 1991 until the present and which are passed to the financial media, such 
as Bloomberg and Reuters. The ZEW’s survey structure is conventional and e.g. similar to 
Consensus Forecasts (London), since around about 75% of the participants of the survey work 
in the banking or bank-related sectors (i.e. retail banks, investment banks, investment funds, 
etc.), whereas the others are either associated with the insurance or industrial sector. Partici-
pants in the data set have about 300 responses on average. The survey asks participants to 
judge whether the respective variable will go up, down or remain unchanged over the next six 
months. The survey raises information on a monthly census of financial market professionals. 
We study the micro data from December 1991 until July 2006, which produces up to 
176 months of data, and the forecasts studied are for the US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and 
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JP-yen/euro (until the end of 1998 the D-mark was used instead of the euro), as well as related 
US, British and Japanese exchange rate fundamentals, i.e. forecasts of inflation, economic 
growths and interest rates. 
Since we study individual forecast series, we have to conduct several adjustments con-
cerning the dataset. The initial sample observations regarding the US-dollar/euro (DM), GB-
pound and Japanese-yen/euro forecasts appear in the first row of Table 1. The second row 
indicates that approximately 36% of all initial forecasts are dropped to ensure consistency. 
Sometimes participants are replaced by new colleagues because of, for example, a job change. 
In such cases, we consider the new participant as another forecaster and we also track the pre-
vious participant, if he continues participating in the survey. Moreover, we set the minimum 
rate of participation to 50%, i.e. we require participation in at least 88 of 176 months, to en-
sure the elimination of accidental forecast accuracy. This reduces the amount of usable fore-
casts to about 25%.8 Finally, we use personal information about the forecasters. This limits 
respective analyses to participants for whom such information is available, which leads to 
further reduction of the forecasts by about 13% (see the fourth row of Table 1). 
Some further characteristics of the final dataset are reported in Table 2. This informa-
tion stems from a specific questionnaire conducted in October 2006. All in all, forecasters’ 
characteristics do not differ meaningfully on average between the three exchange rates. Even 
though the number of women participating in the survey has in recent years risen continu-
ously, most of them do not pass the minimum participation rate; so the share of women is 
fairly low. The average age of participants is 48, whereas experience in financial market prac-
tice averages 21 years. So our representative forecaster is middle-aged and fairly experienced. 
This corresponds to the fact that 41 percent of participants head at least a department. More-
over, 54% of participants have personnel responsibilities, 80% have operational responsibility 
and, finally, 67% of the participants have an academic degree. 
Since we are interested in links between forecasting power in exchange rates and com-
petence in fundamental analysis, we base our analysis on related expectations data. As already 
noted, the ZEW-survey asks about exchange rate forecasts as well as several other economic 
variables. Considering the monetary model as our reference model, we draw on related infla-
tion, interest rate and economic growth forecasts for the US, Great Britain and Japan respec-
tively. Regarding the exchange rate forecasts, we use daily exchange rates of the US-
                                                 
8  The 50% participation threshold obviously excludes many forecasts and thus also forecasters. There 
may be several reasons why participation changes, one reason can be a lack of success. Thus our sam-
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dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and JP-yen/euro (-/D-mark respectively). With respect to our 
fundamental forecasts, we use the monthly data for the euro zone CPI-based inflation rates, 
for industrial production to calculate a measure of monthly income growth, and for 6-month 
Libor rates to represent interest rates.9 
A graphical presentation of the aggregated data – consensus forecasts and correspond-
ing exchange rate changes over time – is shown in Figure 1 for the US-dollar, GB-pound and 
JP-yen.10 At first glance, one can see that the direction of consensus exchange rate expecta-
tions is rather sluggish compared to realized exchange rate changes. This implies that there 
may be periods of “wrong” expectations and, indeed, just looking at the US dollar figure 
shows that such wrong expectations occurred in the early 1990s and, in particular, between 
1998 and 2001. Accordingly, we can reproduce the standard finding of the literature, i.e. inac-
curate (biased) expectations over some periods of time. However, the sign of the bias does 
sometimes switch, which indicates, as mentioned in some prior studies (e.g. Frankel and 
Froot, 1987), that the sample length may be important. Indeed, if we consider the whole 14 
year period, there is no significant bias for any of the three exchange rates. Moreover, the 
graphical impression that expectations for the yen may often have the same sign as realized 
exchange rate changes is confirmed by our calculations: the hit rate of consensus expectations 
is 64.2% for the yen, 58.3% for the dollar but only 48.1% for the pound, so tossing a coin for 
the pound would have yielded a better result in our sample (Appendix 2). On average, 56.2% 
of consensus expectations in the total sample are in the right direction, which is a strong indi-
cation that exchange rate expectations are not systematically distorted in general. 
This seems a reasonable basis to further examine individual forecasts in more detail. In 
doing so different techniques are required than for the so far considered aggregate (consensus) 
forecasts. As we compare now for each forecaster her tri-variate expectations – i.e. up, down 
or no change – with realized exchange rate changes, we need a definition of a “no change” 
band. Fortunately we can rely on a special ZEW survey where individual thresholds have 
                                                                                                                                                        
ple includes some element of survivorship bias. However, this is not relevant for our analysis because 
we examine the relative performance and not much interested in the level of forecasting performance. 
9  Daily exchange rate data are obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank, whereas 6-month Libor rates 
are taken from EcoWin. Industrial productions and CPI inflation stem from IMF’s International Finan-
cial Statistics. German government bond yields are taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank and US, 
British as well as Japanese yields from the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Ja-
pan respectively. 
10  Properties of the individual exchange rate forecasts are shown in Appendix 1 including consensus, 
dispersion and actual exchange rate data. 
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been asked for.11 The response is given separately for all forecast series so that we have direct 
information on how much variables have to change to be regarded as a change (say, for ex-
ample, by three percent). Accordingly, we use related median thresholds, separated for the 
different variables. Although we do not claim that this is a perfect way of proceeding, we re-
gard it as being simple, appropriate and transparent. 
Finally, it is worth noting that we know and also use the exact dates when participants 
gave their forecasts. This is not self-evident since these forecasts are collected each month in 
two-weekly periods, so that the forecasters underlie in principle different market conditions if 
one does not carefully consider the individual response. 
 
4 Heterogeneous performance of forecasters 
In this section, we show that exchange rate forecasters differ with respect to their per-
formance and that these differences are statistically significant and consistent across curren-
cies. 
Forecasters in the ZEW survey make directional forecasts, i.e. they predict that an ex-
change rate will go up, down or remain unchanged over the next six months, and so these 
forecasts can be directly compared to realizations of the exchange rates over the same hori-
zon. The ZEW polls its survey participants about the size of the no change band and this is 
three percent in both directions from the present exchange rate. Accordingly, we regard an 
exchange rate change by less than three percent over the next six months as consistent with a 
no-change prediction. 
As we have three alternatives that a forecaster can choose from, there will only be one 
correct outcome and the forecaster can make two mistakes. In particular, when the exchange 
rate goes up or down, there is the possibility of a more or less severe forecasting mistake, de-
pending on whether the forecasters predicted no change – which is a comparatively small mis-
take – or whether the forecaster predicted the wrong direction of change – which is a com-
paratively large mistake. In order to cover the severity of wrong forecasts we do not simply 
code right or wrong forecasts, but we code three possibilities, i.e. right, small and big mistake. 
The codes for these alternatives are either 2, 1 or 0, so that higher codes indicate better fore-
casts. Forecasting performance is thus measured as directional performance and the measure 
can be understood as a hit rate. 
                                                 
11  Actually, several studies follow the other way round, using specific thresholds in order to quantify 
qualitative forecasts (see surveys by Nardo, 2003, and Pesaran and Weale, 2006). 
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Figure 2 gives the frequency distribution of hit rates that the 150 forecasters realized 
during the sample period for the three currencies. One can directly see from this that there is a 
lot of divergence in forecasting performance. Taking the first graph in Figure 2, for the US 
dollar, almost all forecasters realize an average hit rate of between 0.9 and 1.3, the median 
being about 1.1. The realized hit rates for the GB pound and JP yen show somewhat higher 
values than for the US dollar, as individual hit rates lie basically in the range between 1.0 and 
1.4, with the pound results being comparatively higher. 
These analyses are informative regarding divergence of performance which is the objec-
tive of this paper. However, in order to indicate the individuals’ quality-level of forecasting 
performance, an appropriate benchmark would be the performance of an uninformed fore-
caster who makes exchange rate predictions just by chance. In this way, the realized hit rate of 
random forecasts is calculated. Therefore we take the exchange rate time series and allocate to 
each month either an “up”, “down” or “no change”, according to the preceding six month ef-
fective change. This results in a concrete distribution of changes for our period of time. We 
take this given distribution and simulate 10,000 random time series, then we calculate hit rates 
by comparing the random time series – expressing forecasting by chance – with effective ex-
change rate changes. Obviously, the average simulated random hit rate can differ according to 
the time series properties of the underlying exchange rate.12 We find for our sample that the 
benchmark to be beaten in the case of the US dollar is a simulated hit rate of 1.0975, for the 
pound the value is 1.2530 and it is 1.0928 for the yen – these values, as well as the respective 
95% confidence bands, are also shown in Figure 2. 
The information about the random forecast performance and the individual forecast per-
formances – as graphically presented in Figure 2 – can be used to explicitly show the best and 
worst forecasters in the sample. Appendix 4 gives respective information about hit rates real-
ized for the US dollar. The best forecaster realizes an average hit rate of 1.31 on 101 partici-
pations, which at the one percent level is significantly different from a random forecast. Over-
all, there are six individuals significantly better than the random forecast at the 5% level. In-
terestingly, there are also 14 individuals who are significantly worse at the same level of sig-
nificance. Considering individual forecasting performance of our two other exchange rates 
also gives an interesting result (see Appendices 5 and 6): among 146 pound forecasters, there 
are 24 who produce forecasts that are significantly better than a random forecast at the 5% 
                                                 
12  In particular we do not assume that exchange rates change according to a distribution where one 
third of cases each is exchange rate up, down and no change. In fact, the simulated distribution of the 
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level of significance, but 37 produce forecasts which are worse. The picture is different again 
for the yen, where 58 are better and only 2 worse than the benchmark at the 5% level of sig-
nificance. 
Overall, we find statistically successful and unsuccessful forecasters for all three ex-
change rates. Although the mean performance is very different for the three exchange rates – 
i.e. comparatively the best for the yen, worst for the dollar and very heterogeneous for the 
pound – the coexistence of successful “hot hands” and unsuccessful “cold hands” is a new 
aspect in the foreign exchange literature.13 This finding raises the question of whether skill 
depends on the specific exchange rate or whether it depends on general ability. Fortunately, 
most individuals in our sample – i.e. 145 persons – give forecasts for all three exchange rates. 
We can thus relate their hit rates across exchange rates and consistently find positive correla-
tions. Table 3 shows that the hit rate of US dollar forecasts can be significantly “explained” 
by the quality of pound forecast but not by yen forecasts. Among the three relations between 
currencies, it is only the dollar-yen exchange rate where the spillover is not significant. Nev-
ertheless, even this coefficient is positive and the others are significantly positive, which indi-
cates that performance in forecasting exchange rates is also driven by a general ability and not 
just specific to certain exchange rates. 
This provides a strong motivation to further investigate the possible determinants of 
forecasting performance and, in particular, to investigate a possible role of knowledge. 
 
5 Forecasting the exchange rate and forecasting its fundamentals 
In this section we examine the issue of whether individual heterogeneity in forecasting 
performance can be traced to the performances in other economic variables. Principally, we 
seek to determine if any forecasting success in exchange rates is related to the accuracy of 
fundamental research, i.e. the analysis of exchange rate fundamentals. Since we have access 
to individuals’ exchange rate forecasts and also to their forecasts of fundamental variables – 
all formed at the same time – we can investigate whether such relationships do indeed exist. 
There are several reasons why such an analysis may prove insightful. First, it is demon-
strated in the empirical literature that exchange rates are connected to fundamentals in the 
long run (see recent studies e.g. Rapach and Wohar, 2002, Kilian and Taylor, 2003, and Sarno 
et al., 2009). Second, longer term exchange rate expectations underlie strong fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                        
GB-pound/euro hit rates differs from the two other simulated distributions, because relatively many 
actual GB-pound/euro changes have occurred in the indeterminate interval, i.e. “no change”. 
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considerations (see Cheung and Wong, 2000 and MacDonald, 2000). Third, we already 
showed in Section 3 that the majority of participants of the Financial Market Survey belong to 
groups which follow longer-term considerations, such as analysts and fund managers. Fourth, 
a related study on the stock market by Loh and Mian (2006) reveals such a fundamental rela-
tionship. In fact, they show a fundamental link between the profitability of analysts’ stock 
recommendations and the accuracy of corresponding earnings forecasts. Taken together, this 
motivates us to analyze whether the quality in fundamental analysis coincides with forecast 
success in exchange rates. A priori, we thus expect average hit rates of exchange rate funda-
mentals to be positively correlated with exchange rate hit rates. With respect to the relevant 
fundamental variable set, we choose the monetary model as a baseline and thus consider infla-
tion, economic growth and the interest rate for Euroland, the US, Great Britain and Japan, 
respectively. 
In fact, using the exchange rate fundamentals of the monetary model for all three ex-
change rates, we find a significant positive relationship between superior exchange rates fore-
casts and interest rates forecasts. Additionally, GB-pound forecasts prove to be significantly 
better on average than US-dollar as well as JP-yen forecasts. 
Using a rule-of-thumb calculation, we note that a neutral hit rate would generate a value 
of 1.1. Since most of the average hit rates lie right of 1.1, we at least acknowledge that the 
majority of the forecasters do not form poor forecasts. Although we do not want to overem-
phasize these results, since we have said nothing so far about statistical significance, we nev-
ertheless believe this finding serves as an indicator concerning the overall accuracy of the 
individual exchange rate forecasts. 
In line with our procedure in Section 4, we have to generate qualitative forecast errors 
for all respective fundamentals. However, since these variables have different underlying sta-
tistical characteristics from the exchange rate, individual threshold values have to be consid-
ered. Again, we use the threshold values which have been revealed by the Centre for Eco-
nomic European Research amongst the survey’s participants, via specific questionnaires. Sub-
sequent reported threshold values are measured as percentages of the respective variables, and 
they each indicate if a specific participant classifies a variable to go up or down; a respective 
threshold value of 4.5 percent has been incorporated into our calculations. 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 Of course, already the early studies of Goodman (1979) and Levich (1979) mention this fact but for 
a very small group only, i.e. 9 and 10 participants respectively. 
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Table 4 represents the corresponding results of the relations in forecasting performances 
and fundamentals for the US-dollar/euro, GB-pound/euro and the JP-yen/euro.14 Regarding 
the US-dollar, superior domestic interest rate forecasts significantly correlate with superior 
exchange rate forecasts. In addition, US inflation hit rates exercise a negative influence on 
exchange rate hit rates; however, the latter relationship is not significant at the 5 percent level. 
Turning to the GB-pound, we find that foreign inflation positively influences forecast success 
in exchange rates but only at the ten percent level. However, higher hit rates in both domestic 
and GB-interest rates are significantly related to higher hit rates in exchange rates. Finally, for 
the JP-yen, only hit rates in Japanese interest rates correlate positively and significantly with 
those of the exchange rate. So in respect to all three exchange rate equations, we find only 
significant connections with one or both (domestic and foreign) interest rate hit rates, but con-
sistent with our prior, the signs prove to be positive. 
In order to extend these findings, we now analyze all exchange rate equations simulta-
neously. Table 5 shows corresponding results of the pooled data, where the JP-yen is set as 
the basic currency. Different forecast success rates between the US-dollar, the GB-pound and 
the JP-yen exchange rate can be attributed to different complexities of the respective ex-
change rates. In order to control for these constant country effects, we use a US-dollar dummy 
and a GB-pound dummy. It turns out that the only variables which are significant at the five 
percent level are: domestic and foreign interest rate hits as well as the GB-pound dummy. 
Furthermore, domestic inflation and the US-dollar dummy are significant at the 10 percent 
level. Restricting the model to significant variables via a top down approach, we find that only 
the two interest rates and the GB-pound dummy remain in the model. 
In summary, superior analyses in domestic and foreign interest rates are strongly related 
to greater forecasting success in exchange rates. The significant influence arising from the 
GB-pound dummy confirms the former observation with respect to Figure 2, where exchange 
rate forecasts of the GB-pound appear better than those of the other exchange rates. However, 
the latter finding reveals a constant effect, independent of the performance of fundamental 
analysis. 
 
                                                 
14  Since the minima and maxima of each exchange rate hit rate series are far from their natural bounds 
zero and plus two, there are no extreme aggregate expectations in the sample (see also Appendix 3). 
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6 Personal characteristics of superior exchange rate forecasters 
Due to available personal characteristics of exchange rate forecasters we find that there 
are two significant influences on performance: professional experience in financial markets 
seems to help, whereas responsibility for personnel seems to harm performance. 
The difficulty in analyzing a possible influence from personal characteristics is data 
availability. Indeed, this data are not regularly compiled but stems partly from an additional 
survey that the ZEW sometimes conducts among participants of the ZEW financial market 
survey. As a consequence, the response to this survey provides another restriction to our sam-
ple, further reducing the number of respondents to 93 individuals. However, we consider the 
forecasts of each exchange rate independently, and thus analyze 279 cases. 
In particular, we examine the possible impact of the seven items documented in Table 2 
on forecasting performance. As the average forecasting performance differs much between 
currencies (see Section 4), we include exchange rate dummies in the regression. Moreover, 
we consider findings in the preceding Section 5 and include fundamental forecast perform-
ance in the regression because personal characteristics may be related to forecasting ability in 
fundamentals too. All this raises the stakes for personal characteristics to become significant. 
Table 6 shows the role of personal characteristics in explaining forecasting perform-
ance. Specification (1) gives the result when all variables are considered. It shows that beyond 
the constant, some fundamentals and exchange rate dummies only one personal characteristic 
seems to be important, i.e. a detrimental influence from personnel responsibilities. In another 
specification we reduce the variables considered to those that remain significant. This leads to 
specification (2) where a second personal characteristic of importance appears, i.e. a positive 
influence from experience. 
It is reassuring that regression results on the role of personal characteristics also hold 
when we exclude the fundamental variables (not shown to save space). Moreover, we note 
that the major influences found in Table 5 – i.e. considering the impact of fundamentals fore-
cast performance but not of personal characteristics – remain unchanged, although the number 
of observations is reduced from 442 to 279. We regard this as another sign of robustness and 
it also shows that personal characteristics are important over and above fundamental forecasts, 
although the latter are comparatively more important than personal characteristics. 
 
7 The relation between directional forecasting success and profits 
As a robustness test, we examine whether directional forecasting success translates into 
profits. We find, indeed, and in accordance with earlier studies, that our results hold in a 
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qualitative sense when the directional performance measures used so far are substituted by 
profits. 
Professionals participating in the ZEW survey give their directional expectations and it 
seems reasonable to form a trading strategy based on these expectations. Accordingly, we 
assume that the expectation of an “up” of the US dollar is translated into a US dollar long 
position, a “down” into a short and a “no change” into a neutral position. Although the expec-
tations are formed for six-month horizons, the possibility of new information should be con-
sidered, so that effectively, a position may be changed whenever the expectation changes, 
which may occur once per month. Then the return for each month is calculated, assuming that 
the asset value is always the same; in particular, this procedure excludes cumulating profits. 
Finally, these (gross) profits resulting purely from exchange rate changes are complemented 
by net profits where the interest rate difference against the euro is taken into account.15 
Based on this procedure, the graphical distribution of returns for about 150 individuals, 
separated for the three exchange rates is obviously very similar to the frequency distribution 
of hit rates introduced above (Figure 2). If we take the zero profit position as a benchmark, we 
also recognize that trading strategies based on forecasters’ expectations would yield some 
profits in most cases (see Appendix 7).16 Overall, forecasters’ performance measured by prof-
its produces the same qualitative picture as the hit rate measure: professionals’ expectations 
are more often accurate than inaccurate. 
Clearly, the same qualitative result does not necessarily imply that it is driven by the 
same persons. Thus, we examine the relations – person by person – between the performance 
measured by hit rates and that measured by profits, for the three exchange rates individually. 
Table 7 shows that there is a highly significant positive relation. This relation holds independ-
ent of the method applied, i.e. either an OLS regression or (non)parametric correlations (see 
also Figure 3). 
Finally, we follow the direction of Elliott and Ito (1999) and test whether forecasting re-
turns may be a compensation for risk. We do not find many significant relations and in the 
cases which are, they often have the “wrong” sign (see Table 8). This indicates that forecast-
                                                 
15  The translation of expectations in trading strategies requires making some assumptions and is thus 
open to criticism. Therefore, we regard the profit calculations as a robustness exercise only and prefer 
to stick as closely as possible to the available information, i.e. directional expectations, and assess 
them via the hit rate measure. 
16  Accordingly, the average yearly returns for the best and the worst 25 forecasters in the US-
dollar/euro, which would have been realized by following corresponding forecasts month-by-month, 
are qualitatively similar to the result based on hit rates (see Appendix 8). 
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ers’ performance holds after risk-adjustment, a finding which is largely consistent with the 
results in Elliott and Ito (1999). 
 
8 Conclusion 
The research reported in this paper seeks to shed new light on a long-standing puzzle in 
international finance, namely the finding of inaccurate, and even irrational, consensus ex-
change rate expectations of professional forecasters. In order to gain more insight into this 
issue we employ a new dataset which has three advantages over previous studies: first, it con-
tains truly individual (and not firm-specific) data; second, it spans a long time period (more 
than 14 years) and a broad cross section (we rely on about 150 persons); third, and perhaps 
most interestingly, individuals’ exchange rate expectations can be linked to other information, 
such as individual expectations on exchange rate fundamentals and forecasters’ personal char-
acteristics. 
We use this comprehensive dataset to reveal that skill is an important determinant of 
forecasting performance in three ways: first, professional exchange rate forecasters forming 
superior directional expectations on one exchange rate are likely to forecast better on other 
exchange rates as well; second, superior forecasters make use of their knowledge about rele-
vant fundamentals; and, third, their performance is influenced by experience (positively) and 
by personnel responsibilities (negatively). 
These findings contribute to an assessment of foreign exchange markets that is similar 
to that of other financial markets: professionals in this market do not behave irrationally in 
that they consistently form unnecessarily bad expectations but their expectations reflect their 
differential forecasting skill. These results are not due to the use of a particular dataset. Trans-
lating the directional expectations into consensus point forecasts for shorter samples – i.e. 
repeating the exercises of Frankel and Froot (1987) and others – reproduces their finding as 
these consensus expectations are often inaccurate and irrational. However, this does not apply 
to the full sample. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection criteria and related observations 
 number of forecasts 
 
sum of fore-
casts US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
raw sample 156,040 53,750 51,384 50,906 
consistent sample 100,315 34,482 33,192 32,641 
50% participation sample 60,540 20,965 19,834 19,741 
final sample 40,344 13,859 13,280 13,205 
Notes: The raw sample has to be corrected since we focus on identified persons, i.e. consistency criteria. Since 
participants of the survey change occasionally their professions, sometimes it happens that someone adopts the 
identity number (ID) of the former college. This would obviously bias our forecast series, therefore, we track on 
new individuals lodging them internally under new ID’s and if possible, tracking changing participants on their 
new job under their ID. Furthermore, adopting the participation criteria, we set a minimum participation rate of 
50%, meaning that only these persons are considered, who participate at least 88 times at the survey (in total, we 
deal with 176 months). Finally, for the final sample, we use personal information, which requires a selection via 
the personal criteria. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2  
Personal characteristics of the forecasters 
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
    
share of women 2% 1% 1% 
average age in years 48 48 48 
average experience in years 21 21 21 
share of participants with academic background 68% 67% 67% 
share of participants holding a chief position 40% 41% 42% 
share of participants with operational responsibilities 80% 80% 80% 
share of participants with personnel responsibilities 53% 54% 55% 
Notes: These characteristics are based upon the final sample after adopting the personal criteria, see Table 1. 
This information follows from a specific questionnaire conducted in October 2006. The share of women accord-
ing to the questionnaire response is higher than displayed above, because the share of female participants was 
low in the beginning years of the survey and has risen continuously until today. The characteristic experience is 
explicitly asked for experience in financial markets. Participants are considered having an academic background 
if they hold a bachelor, master or doctor degree. Furthermore, we judge participants as capturing a chief position, 
if they head at least a department. Operational responsibilities correspond to an employee who operates on its 
own authority, whereas personnel responsibilities is defined the way that someone can take disciplinary actions 
against junior staff – nevertheless, that must not automatically relate to a chief position. Finally, about 75% of the 
participants of the survey work in the banking sector (i.e. retail banks, investment banks, investment funds, etc.), 
whereas the others are either associated to the insurance or industrial sector. So, the survey’s composition turns 
out being very similar to others, e.g. Consensus Forecasts London with 75% working in financial institutions. 
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TABLE 3  Interrelations between hit rate performances 
  with ii
hr
j
hr
i efxfx +⋅+= βα j ≠  
  US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
 const. 0.82*** [0.000] 0.49*** [0.004] 0.83*** [0.000] 
 US-dollar - [n. a.] 0.22** [0.042] 0.08 [0.299] 
 GB-pound 0.13** [0.042] - [n. a.] 0.21*** [0.000] 
 JP-yen 0.09 [0.299] 0.42*** [0.000] - [n. a.] 
 N 145 145 145 
 R2 0.05 0.13 0.05 
 adj. R2 0.04 0.12 0.09 
 F-statistic 3.73** [0.027] 10.47*** [0.000] 2.57* [0.049] 
Notes: We assume a 6-month forecast horizons for the exchange rates and set the expectation threshold – accord-
ing to these forecasters’ statement – at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct qualita-
tive forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 a dou-
ble forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respective rate falls). We run OLS estimations, each 
exchange rate as the dependent variable, respectively. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in 
the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. Single correlations between the exchange rates 
show up as following: US-dollar and GB-pound 0.206, US-dollar and JP-yen 0.147, GB-pound and JP-yen 0.320. 
 
 
TABLE 4  Hit rates performance of FX and fundamental forecasts 
i
hr
i
hr
i eXfx +⋅+= θα  
  US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
 const. 1.04*** [0.000] 0.36 [0.110] 0.92*** [0.000] 
 Inflation -0.05 [0482] -0.17* [0.092] -0.03 [0.743] 
 Inflation* -0.12* [0.093] 0.16 [0.104] -0.01 [0.618] 
 Growth -0.11 [0.106] -0.05 [0.591] -0.07 [0.345] 
 growth* -0.01 [0. 920] 0.09 [0.424] 0.10 [0.311] 
 Interest 0.29*** [0.001] 0.24** [0.021] 0.02 [0.794] 
 interest* -0.00 [0.993] 0.35*** [0.000] 0.15*** [0.008] 
 N 152 145 145 
 R2 0.11 0.30 0.07 
 adj. R2 0.07 0.27 0.03 
 F-statistic 2.87** [0.011] 9.82*** [0.000] 1.81 [0.101] 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume 6-
month forecast horizons for the exchange rates and the fundamentals as well. We set expectation thresholds at 
different rates: Exchange rates 3%, inflation, growth and interest rates at 4.5%, respectively. The hit rates range 
from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast 
but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respec-
tive rate falls). We run regressions separated for the exchange rates using OLS. The minimum participation is set 
at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. Following mean hit rates result, 
when we set the latter restriction: US-dollar 1.10, GB-pound 1.22 and JP-yen 120. Asterisks refer to the regres-
sors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 5 
Hit rate performance of FX and fundamental forecasts 
ij
hr
i
hr
i eDXfx +⋅+⋅+= κθα  
  full model restricted model 
 const. 0.71*** [0.000] 0.55*** [0.000] 
 Inflation -0.10* [0.059] - [n. a.] 
 Inflation* -0.01 [0.562] - [n. a.] 
 Growth -0.07 [0.152] - [n. a.] 
 growth* 0.06 [0.334] - [n. a.] 
 Interest 0.19*** [0.001] 0.13*** [0.008] 
 interest* 0.22*** [0.000] 0.27*** [0.000] 
 D1  (US-dollar) -0.03* [0.086] - [n. a.] 
 D2 (GB-pound) 0.08*** [0.000] 0.09*** [0.000] 
 N 442  442  
 R2 0.37  0.35  
 adj. R2 0.35  0.35  
 F-statistic 31.13*** [0.000] 79.90*** [0.000] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We run a combined 
regression for all three exchange rates using OLS. We assume a 6-month forecast horizons for the exchange rates 
and the fundamentals as well and set the expectation threshold at different rates: Exchange rates 3%, inflation, 
growth and interest rates at 4.5%, respectively. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct 
qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 
a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respective rate falls). We add two country dummies 
in order to control for country effects with dummy 1 represents the US and dummy 2 GB. The minimum partici-
pation is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. Following mean hit 
rate results, when we set the latter restriction: 1.1713. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in 
the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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TABLE 6 
Hit rate performance of FX, fundamental forecasts and personal information 
iij
hr
i
hr
i eYDXfx +⋅+⋅+⋅+= ωκθα  
  full model restricted model 
 const. 0.62*** [0.000] 0.57*** [0.000] 
 Inflation -0.16** [0.032] - [n. a.] 
 Inflation* 0.01 [0.806] - [n. a.] 
 Growth -0.08 [0.184] - [n. a.] 
 growth* 0.14* [0.062] - [n. a.] 
 Interest 0.20*** [0.008] 0.13* [0.052] 
 interest* 0.22*** [0.000] 0.25*** [0.000] 
 D1  (US-dollar) -0.02 [0.362] - [n. a.] 
 D2 (GB-pound) 0.09*** [0.000] 0.09*** [0.000] 
 Sex -0.03 [0.488] - [n. a.] 
 age 0.00 [0.749] - [n. a.] 
 experience 0.01 [0.251] 0.01** [0.014] 
 academic 0.01 [0.341] - [n. a.] 
 chief 0.01 [0.272] - [n. a.] 
 operations -0.01 [0.725] - [n. a.] 
 personnel -0.04*** [0.005] -0.03*** [0.003] 
 N 279  279  
 R2 0.38  0.35  
 adj. R2 0.35  0.34  
 F-statistic 10.81*** [0.000] 30.03*** [0.000] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We run a combined 
regression for all three exchange rates using OLS. We assume a 6-month forecast horizons for the exchange rates 
and the fundamentals as well. We set the expectation thresholds at different rates: Exchange rates 3%, inflation, 
growth and interest rates at 4.5%, respectively. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct 
qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. no change forecast but actually the respective rate falls) and 0 
a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the respective rate falls). The minimum participation is 
set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months. Following mean hit rate re-
sults, when we set the latter restriction: 1.1756. We add two country dummies in order to control for country 
effects with dummy 1 represents the US and dummy 2 GB. Moreover we control for the following personal char-
acteristics of the participants: Sex (1 male, 0 female), age, experience (in years), academic (1 university degree, 0 
not), chief (1 yes, 0 no), operations (1 operational responsibilities, 0 not) and personnel (1 personnel responsibili-
ties, 0 not). Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five 
and one percent. 
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TABLE 7 
Relation between hit rates returns in exchange rate forecasting 
  i
hr
i
re
i efxfx +⋅+= βα
  US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
 const. -1.01*** [0.000] -0.64*** [0.000] -0.79*** [0.001] 
 hit rate 0.98*** [0.000] 0.52*** [0.000] 0.80*** [0.000] 
 N 152 146 146 
 R2 0.1793 0.1637 0.1024 
 adj. R2 0.1738 0.1579 0.0961 
 F-statistic 32.77*** [0.0000] 28.20*** [0.0000] 16.42*** [0.0001] 
Notes: The hit rates and returns are taken from calculations mentioned above. We run OLS estimations, each 
exchange rate as the dependent variable, respectively. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in 
the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. Single correlations between the two performance 
measurements show up as following:  US-dollar 0.4234, GB-pound 0.4047 and JP-yen 0.3200. Further, rank-
correlations add up to: US-dollar 0.4645, GB-pound 0.3488 and JP-yen 0.2730. 
 
 
 
 25
TABLE 8 
Relation between forecasting returns and different risk measures 
  tt
re
ti eriskfx +⋅+= βα,
 US-dollar GB-pound JP-yen 
  t (H0 = 0)  t (H0 = 0)  t (H0 = 0) 
Risk premium       
max. 0.1080*** 2.6192 0.0973** 2.1456 0.1879*** 3.4994 
min. -0.1576*** -3.3103 -0.1342*** -2.6424 -0.1081 -1.5644 
Average -0.0023 -0.1091 -0.0093*** -0.2121 0.0408 0.5734 
(+) sig. 5% level 1  1  6  
(-) sig. 5% level 7  8  0  
       
Dispersion       
max. 0.3353*** 3.8069 0.2808*** 2.8952 0.5671*** 3.1819 
min. -0.1843 -1.5935 -0.3453** -2.5681 -0.7124*** -3.1410 
Average 0.0894 -0.1091 0.0184 0.1016 0.0145 0.1069 
(+) sig. 5% level 17  4  5  
(-) sig. 5% level 0  3  4  
       
Lagged FX       
max. 0.1753*** 3.1565 0.1561** 2.5479 0.1682*** 2.7100 
min. -0.1753*** -2.8210 -0.1230*** -2.8294 -0.1770*** -2.6557 
Average -0.0121 -0.1916 -0.0286 -0.4700 -0.0051 -0.0922 
(+) sig. 5% level 4  2  4  
(-) sig. 5% level 8  14  6  
       
Forward Prem.       
max. 6.6624*** 3.5010 2.3297** 2.4488 10.3996*** 4.0609 
min. -1.8349** -2.3892 -4.9604*** -2.7322 -7.4488** -2.1439 
Average 0.7425 0.4998 0.0326 0.0129 2.4710 0.6639 
(+) sig. 5% level 10  1  10  
(-) sig. 5% level 1  5  1  
Notes: For each forecaster we run Newey-West regressions using 5 lags separated for the US-dollar/-, GB-
pound/- and JP-yen/euro (in total 153, 146 and 146, respectively). We regress respective individual profits on 
five different risk proxies, i.e. the risk premium, dispersion, 1-month lagged exchange rate change and the for-
ward premium, respectively. The risk premium is the difference between the forward rate and the consensus, i.e. 
the average expected exchange rate (see Frankel and Froot, 1987), whereas dispersion, i.e. expectation heteroge-
neity, is the cross section variability in the individual forecasts. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of signifi-
cance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
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Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. The graphs show 
the time series of consensus (solid lines) and related spot rate changes (dashed lines) separately – moving from 
top to bottom – in the US-dollar/-, GB-pound/- and JP-yen/euro (until 1998, /D-Mark). 
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F 2 Histograms of hit rates on exchange rate forecasts 
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Notes: The hit rates are based upon the individual 6-month US-dollar/euro expectations from Dec. 1991 until 
July 2006. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast 
error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the exchange rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast 
of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). This histograms show the distributions of the hit rates, when mov-
ing from top to bottom, in the US-dollar, GB-pound and JP-yen (each versus euro, with the D-Mark until 1998 
respectively), considering only participants with at least 50% participation (see further information in Table 1). 
The dashed lines represent the mean (the middle one) as well as the borders of the 95%-confidence interval (the 
left and the right ones) of corresponding bootstrap results for the respective exchange rates, respectively. 
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F 3 Scatter plots of (yearly) net returns and corresponding hit rates 
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Notes: The (yearly) net returns are based upon the individual 6-month US-dollar/euro expectations from Dec. 
1991 until July 2006. The scatter-plos show the net returns and corresponding hit rates, when moving from top to 
bottom, in the euro/US-dollar, euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- respectively), consider-
ing only participants with at least 50% participation (see further information in Table 1). The returns range for 
the US-dollar from -0.0592 to 0.0908, for the GB-pound from -0.0484 to 0.0695 and for the JP-yen from -0.0404 
to 0.1138.  
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Appendix  
 
A1  
Descriptive statistics of aggregated forecasts and actual exchange rates 
 US-dollar/euro GB-pound/euro JP-yen/euro 
6-m. ∆ FX 0.0031 0.0003 -0.0009 
std. 6-m. ∆ FX 0.0701 0.0581 0.0838 
min. 6-m. ∆ FX -0.1488 -0.1649 -0.2392 
max. 6-m. ∆ FX 0.1459 0.1922 0.1847 
    
∆ consensus -0.0093 0.0153 0.0130 
std. ∆ consensus 0.0602 0.0260 0.0254 
min. ∆ consensus -0.1736 -0.0300 -0.0308 
max. ∆ consensus 0.1155 0.0800 0.0783 
    
∆ dispersion 0.0698 0.0412 0.0431 
std. ∆ dispersion 0.0161 0.0108 0.0089 
min. ∆ dispersion 0.0431 0.0234 0.0278 
max. ∆ dispersion 0.1323 0.0860 0.0795 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. All variables are 
measured in changes and therefore marked with the symbol ∆. Using Carlson and Parkin’s (1975) quantification 
procedure and setting a 3% threshold, we generate consensus forecasts. Asterisks refer to the significance level: 
*, **, *** to ten, five and one percent.  
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A 2  
Bias and hit rate in consensus exchange rate forecasts 
tterror εα +=Δ  
 with    e tttt fxfxerror 6, −Δ−Δ=Δ
 US-dollar/euro GB-pound/euro JP-yen/euro 
sub periods    
(1)     bias (6-months) 0.0751*** 0.0120 -0.0191 
[prob. value] # [0.000] [0.556] [0.304] 
(2)     bias (6-months) -0.0487*** -0.0518*** -0.0417 
[prob. value] # [0.021] [0.000] [0.118] 
(3)     bias (6-months) 0.1667 -0.0062 0.0210** 
[prob. value] # [0.298] [0.522] [0.036] 
total period    
bias (6-months) 0.0146 -0.0154 -0.0143 
[prob. value] # [0.318] [0.121] [0.248] 
  
hit rate 0.5833* 0.4808* 0.6418* 
 [0.086] [0.099] [0.083] 
Notes: The sample contains 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. The sub periods are 
defined as follows: (1) 1992-1995, (2) 1996-2000 and (3) 2001-2006. The errors underlying the consensus bias 
are based upon the difference between the actual exchange rate change (1-month and 6-month, respectively) and 
the related consensus forecast. A positive (negative) sign means that the foreign currency-strength is on average 
overrated (underrated). Using Carlson and Parkin’s (1975) quantification procedure and setting a 3% threshold, 
we generate consensus forecasts. All regressions are estimated by Newey-West standard-errors. The hit rate 
shows the share of accurate direction forecasts and is evaluated via a χ2-test, which is based under the null hy-
pothesis that the forecast accuracy is purely chance, i.e. a hit rate of 0.5. Asterisks refer to the significance level: 
*, **, *** to ten, five and one percent.  
 
 
 
A 3 
 
Exchange rate hit rate statistics 
 mean median 25%-q. 75%-q. max. min. std. dev. 
US-dollar 1.0966 1.1062 1.0443 1.1534 1.2566 0.7979 0.0773 
GB-pound 1.2231 1.2339 1.1411 1.3016 1.4494 0.7191 0.1169 
JP-yen 1.1960 1.2114 1.1465 1.2473 1.3775 0.9368 0.0833 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the exchange rate hit rate series employed in 
the empirical analysis separately for the US-dollar/-, GB-pound/- and JP-yen/euro (-/D-mark 
respectively).   
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A 4 
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the US-dollar (hit rates) 
strong hands [probability] participation weak hands [probability] participation 
1.31*** [0.001] 101 0.76*** [0.000] 93 
1.28*** [0.002] 151 0.81*** [0.000] 98 
1.24** [0.021] 97 0.91*** [0.001] 149 
1.24** [0.021] 169 0.92*** [0.003] 135 
1.23** [0.032] 88 0.92*** [0.004] 119 
1.22** [0.036] 125 0.93*** [0.005] 144 
1.22* [0.051] 153 0.93*** [0.005] 101 
1.21* [0.053] 112 0.93*** [0.005] 146 
1.21* [0.059] 118 0.93*** [0.006] 153 
1.21* [0.061] 166 0.94*** [0.009] 134 
1.21* [0.062] 157 0.95** [0.012] 169 
1.21* [0.067] 96 0.97** [0.030] 94 
1.21* [0.074] 141 0.97** [0.035] 140 
1.20* [0.078] 142 0.97** [0.036] 143 
1.20* [0.079] 103 0.98* [0.052] 108 
1.20* [0.079] 108 0.98* [0.053] 113 
1.20* [0.080] 172 0.99* [0.062] 143 
1.20* [0.097] 91 1.00 [0.102] 108 
1.20* [0.100] 142 1.00 [0.102] 147 
1.20 [0.104] 148 1.01 [0.127] 153 
1.19 [0.113] 93 1.01 [0.127] 151 
1.19 [0.137] 96 1.01 [0.156] 154 
1.18 [0.149] 119 1.01 [0.159] 147 
1.18 [0.151] 130 1.01 [0.159] 146 
1.18 [0.158] 153 1.01 [0.161] 142 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 repre-
senting a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the ex-
change rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). The 
minimum participation is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 months with 
sample mean participation of 133, minimum of 88 and maximum of 173 months. Though, 152 individuals re-
main with a mean hit rate of 1.09. Corresponding p-values of the realized hit rates are calculated via bootstrap 
technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five 
and one percent. 
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A 5  
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the GB-pound (hit rates) 
strong hands [probability] participation weak hands [probability] participation 
1.45*** [0.000] 150 0.95*** [0.000] 89 
1.43*** [0.000] 104 1.00*** [0.000] 96 
1.43*** [0.000] 88 1.03*** [0.000] 90 
1.42*** [0.001] 111 1.03*** [0.000] 93 
1.42*** [0.001] 137 1.04*** [0.000] 109 
1.41*** [0.002] 118 1.04*** [0.000] 119 
1.40*** [0.002] 89 1.05*** [0.000] 115 
1.40*** [0.003] 140 1.06*** [0.000] 171 
1.40*** [0.003] 153 1.07*** [0.000] 97 
1.39*** [0.004] 152 1.07*** [0.000] 110 
1.39*** [0.005] 145 1.07*** [0.000] 151 
1.39*** [0.006] 118 1.07*** [0.000] 161 
1.39*** [0.006] 144 1.09*** [0.000] 146 
1.39*** [0.007] 168 1.09*** [0.000] 156 
1.38*** [0.009] 107 1.09*** [0.000] 96 
1.38** [0.011] 132 1.10*** [0.001] 94 
1.38** [0.011] 103 1.10*** [0.001] 125 
1.37** [0.017] 113 1.11*** [0.001] 100 
1.37** [0.024] 156 1.11*** [0.001] 110 
1.36** [0.031] 150 1.12*** [0.002] 91 
1.35** [0.045] 173 1.12*** [0.003] 136 
1.35** [0.046] 159 1.12*** [0.003] 143 
1.35** [0.046] 125 1.12*** [0.003] 102 
1.35** [0.047] 145 1.13*** [0.005] 141 
1.35* [0.054] 172 1.13*** [0.005] 113 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 repre-
senting a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the ex-
change rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). The 
minimum participation (part.) is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 
months with sample mean participation of 132, minimum of 88 and maximum of 173 months. Though, 146 indi-
viduals remain with a mean hit rate of 1.23. Corresponding p-values of the realized hit rates are calculated via 
bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to 
ten, five and one percent. 
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A 6  
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the JP-yen (hit rates) 
strong hands [probability] participation weak hands [probability] participation 
1.37*** [0.000] 151 0.91*** [0.001] 107 
1.37*** [0.000] 125 0.95** [0.011] 95 
1.35*** [0.000] 144 1.00 [0.105] 97 
1.34*** [0.000] 161 1.00 [0.105] 102 
1.33*** [0.000] 141 1.00 [0.105] 130 
1.32*** [0.000] 88 1.01 [0.129] 169 
1.32*** [0.000] 130 1.01 [0.153] 90 
1.30*** [0.000] 151 1.01 [0.165] 150 
1.30*** [0.000] 159 1.01 [0.173] 135 
1.30*** [0.000] 156 1.03 [0.250] 111 
1.29*** [0.000] 143 1.03 [0.299] 150 
1.29*** [0.001] 167 1.03 [0.301] 119 
1.29*** [0.001] 142 1.05 [0.446] 122 
1.29*** [0.001] 118 1.06 [0.574] 132 
1.29*** [0.001] 105 1.07 [0.709] 98 
1.28*** [0.001] 152 1.09 [0.958] 156 
1.28*** [0.002] 145 1.09 [0.966] 166 
1.27*** [0.004] 168 1.09 [0.982] 153 
1.26*** [0.004] 108 1.09 [0.983] 142 
1.26*** [0.004] 139 1.09 [0.997] 162 
1.26*** [0.004] 147 1.09 [0.997] 108 
1.26*** [0.004] 89 1.09 [0.997] 108 
1.26*** [0.004] 117 1.10 [0.899] 90 
1.26*** [0.004] 121 1.11 [0.789] 111 
1.25*** [0.006] 172 1.11 [0.717] 141 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly observations from December 1991 until July 2006. We assume a 
6-month forecast horizon and set the expectation threshold at 3%. The hit rates range from 0 to 2, with 2 repre-
senting a correct qualitative forecast, 1 a simple forecast error (e.g. forecast of no change but actually the ex-
change rate falls) and 0 a double forecast error (e.g. forecast of a rise but actually the exchange rate falls). The 
minimum participation (part.) is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at least at 88 
months with sample mean participation of 132, minimum of 88 and maximum of 172 months. Though, 146 indi-
viduals remain with a mean hit rate of 1.18. Corresponding p-values of the realized hit rates are calculated via 
bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to 
ten, five and one percent. 
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A 7 Histograms of average 1-month returns on exchange rate forecasts 
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Notes: The average 1-month returns are based upon the individual 6-month US-dollar/euro expectations from 
Dec. 1991 until July 2006. These returns are net of respective interest rates, so taking into account related inter-
est rate spreads. This histograms show the distributions of the returns, when moving from top to bottom, in the 
euro/US-dollar, euro/GB-pound and euro/JP-yen (each with the D-Mark/- respectively), considering only par-
ticipants with at least 50% participation (see further information in Table 1). The returns range for the US-dollar 
from -0.51 to 0.73, for the GB-pound from -0.41 to 0.56 and for the JP-yen from -0.34 to 0.90. 
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A 8 
Best and worst 25 forecasters in the US-dollar (annualized average returns) 
winning 
hands [probability] participation loosing hands [probability] participation 
0.0908*** 0.0000 98 -0.0592*** 0.0039 136 
0.0583*** 0.0078 148 -0.0456** 0.0267 133 
0.0561** 0.0103 110 -0.0436** 0.0343 170 
0.0525** 0.0164 106 -0.0402* 0.0514 94 
0.0509** 0.0199 173 -0.0388* 0.0604 91 
0.0508** 0.0202 149 -0.0371* 0.0724 147 
0.0500** 0.0221 161 -0.0346* 0.0943 120 
0.0478** 0.0286 149 -0.0311 0.1320 141 
0.0468** 0.0322 89 -0.0311 0.1325 108 
0.0458** 0.0358 134 -0.0298 0.1488 109 
0.0413* 0.0582 97 -0.0277 0.1800 91 
0.0392* 0.0724 118 -0.0274 0.1855 158 
0.0384* 0.0779 90 -0.0267 0.1964 158 
0.0380* 0.0810 153 -0.0267 0.1968 113 
0.0375* 0.0850 152 -0.0261 0.2062 151 
0.0362* 0.0965 112 -0.0231 0.2639 93 
0.0346 0.1117 136 -0.0230 0.2656 163 
0.0342 0.1159 124 -0.0222 0.2832 104 
0.0336 0.1227 157 -0.0221 0.2838 95 
0.0335 0.1236 170 -0.0211 0.3074 154 
0.0324 0.1362 168 -0.0172 0.4039 98 
0.0309 0.1562 170 -0.0169 0.4121 148 
0.0294 0.1769 130 -0.0164 0.4259 103 
0.0290 0.1826 150 -0.0156 0.4492 144 
0.0287 0.1869 126 -0.0156 0.4497 148 
Notes: The results are based upon 176 monthly data sets from December 1991 until July 2006. Above captioned 
numbers are expressed in average annual returns, i.e. the best individual forecaster shows an average return of 
9.08% per year. The minimum participation is set at 50%, so we consider only individuals who participated at 
least at 88 months. This leads to a reduced sample of 153 individuals with a mean participation of 133 as well as 
minimum and maximum of 88 and 174 months, respectively. The related mean return amounts to 0.66% per 
year. Corresponding p-values are calculated via bootstrap technique. Asterisks refer to the regressors’ level of 
significance in the short-term relations: *, **, *** to ten, five and one percent. 
 
